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Abstract
This paper investigates how multinational banks use internal debt to shift profits to low-
taxed affiliates. Using regulatory data on multinational banks headquartered in Germany, 
we show that banks use this tax avoidance channel more aggressively than non-financial 
multinationals do. We find that a ten percentage points higher corporate tax rate increases 
the internal net debt ratio by 5.7 percentage points, corresponding to a 20% increase at 
the mean. Our study also takes into account the existence of conduit entities, which sim-
ply pass through financial flows. If conduit entities are systematically located in low-tax 
countries, previous studies may have underestimated the extent of debt shifting.
Keywords Profit shifting · Internal debt · Multinational banks · Taxation
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1 Introduction
In the last years, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and G20 have started an unprecedented initiative against Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS). This initiative builds on a large body of empirical research 
that has identified the main channels of BEPS (Dharmapala 2014). One of these 
channels is the strategic use of debt, exploiting the tax-deductibility of interest pay-
ments. Most of this empirical literature, however, excludes the financial sector. This 
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omission is all the more surprising as, in many countries, the financial sector con-
tributes around a quarter of corporate tax revenues.1 The OECD has recognized this 
gap and published a discussion draft entitled “Approaches to Address BEPS Involv-
ing Interest in the Banking and Insurance Sectors” as part of Action 4 on the limita-
tion of interest deductions in 2016.2
The tax deductibility of interest payments enables both base erosion and profit 
shifting: When a bank borrows from a third party, the resulting interest payments 
lower its taxable profit. Higher risks for shareholders and regulatory requirements 
limit the extent to which banks can erode their tax base in this way. When a bank 
affiliate borrows internally, i.e. from a different subsidiary of the same bank group, 
profit is shifted to that subsidiary. The interest payment is tax deductible in the bor-
rowing affiliate, while the interest income is taxed in the lending affiliate—usually 
located in a strategically chosen low-tax country. As internal debt does not increase 
the overall leverage of the bank group, it does not entail risks for the ultimate share-
holders. Previous literature (de  Mooij and Keen 2016; Heckemeyer and de  Mooij 
2017) has studied the tax responsiveness of external debt, i.e. base erosion. How-
ever, to our knowledge, no previous paper studies how banks can use (internal) 
interest payments to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions.
Our paper aims to fill this gap. Using administrative data provided by the German 
central bank, we show that banks indeed use internal debt to shift profits to low-
tax countries, and that they do so more aggressively than non-financial firms. Our 
dataset, the External Positions of Banks database, has information on bilateral finan-
cial flows between the foreign subsidiaries and branches of all German multinational 
banks. Using panel regressions with and without affiliate fixed effects, we find that a 
ten percentage points higher corporate tax rate increases the internal debt-to-assets 
ratio by about 5.1 percentage points. This absolute response is much stronger than 
the effect that Fuest et  al. (2011) and Buettner et al. (2012) find for non-banks in 
a comparable setting.3 Thus, the banking sector uses internal debt shifting more 
aggressively than other sectors of the economy.
A second contribution of this paper is methodological. It arises from the impor-
tance of conduit entities in internal debt financing. Such conduit affiliates pass 
through internal loans, without shifting any profits away from themselves. There are 
three potential reasons why multinationals might use conduit entities: First, the con-
duit entities might simply serve as financial hubs, coordinating internal financing. 
1 The financial sector in Germany in 2014 paid 26% of total corporate tax revenues (Statistisches Bun-
desamt 2019). Finance and insurance firms in the U.S. in 2015 contributed 31% of total pre-tax profits 
(Internal Revenue Service 2019).
2 See https ://www.oecd.org/tax/aggre ssive /discu ssion -draft -beps-actio n-4-banki ng-and-insur ance-secto 
r.pdf.
3 Fuest et al. (2011) and Buettner et al. (2012) show that a ten percentage points higher corporate tax 
rate increases internal debt-to-asset ratios in non-banks by 1.77–2.14 percentage points. When relating 
these figures to the sample mean of internal debt-to-asset ratios (42% in our sample, 23% and 28% in 
these previous studies on German non-banks), our results correspond to an increase by about 12%, com-
pared to 7% to 8% for non-banks. Note that due to different data sources, the definition of the internal 
debt-to-asset ratio is not fully comparable.
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Second, passing loans through an additional affiliate also impedes the uncovering 
of the tax avoidance scheme by the tax authorities or the media. Third, the pass-
through loans offer an additional profit shifting possibility by mispricing the related 
interest rates. Despite the existence of these pass-through loans, the literature on 
internal debt shifting uses internal gross liabilities as proxy for the volume of inter-
nal debt shifting. If the location of the conduit entities correlates with tax rates, this 
proxy systematically underestimates the true amount of debt shifting.
We show that conduit entities are indeed systematically located in low-tax coun-
tries. To account for the arising bias, we propose a new dependent variable, the 
internal net-debt-to-assets ratio. Briefly put, it captures internal liabilities net of 
internal claims relative to total assets. Using this variable, we estimate a slightly 
higher tax rate coefficient, even though the sample mean of the internal net-debt-to-
assets ratio is substantially lower. We find that a ten percentage points higher corpo-
rate tax rate increases the internal net-debt-to-assets ratio by 5.7 percentage points, 
which corresponds to an increase of 20% at the mean.
Our results also add to the current policy debate on multinational taxation. A 
main policy-relevant finding is that profit shifting in the financial sector is sub-
stantial: The size of the financial sector in the economy, combined with the high 
tax elasticities found in this paper, implies a substantial potential revenue loss. 
At the same time, the main current anti-tax avoidance rules, controlled-foreign-
corporation (CFC) and thin capitalization rules, either do not apply to or are not 
effective in the financial sector. CFC rules stipulate that passive income from a 
low-tax subsidiary is added to the profit of the parent company and taxed there. 
Usually, interest payments on internal debt are passive income, but many coun-
tries have exemptions for banks, as interest income is their main business.4 When 
interest income is deemed active income, CFC rules are toothless for banks. 
Moreover, CFC rules are not compatible with EU law and are currently not 
applied within the EU. Thin capitalization rules usually limit the deductibility 
of net interest expenses to a certain fraction (often 30%) of an adjusted earnings 
measure. Several countries exempt banks from these rules (e.g. Belgium, France, 
Greece, Italy, Spain) or have more lax rules for banks (e.g. China, Japan, United 
Kingdom). In other countries (e.g. Germany, Portugal, USA), thin capitalization 
rules apply to banks; however, as these rules consider net interest (i.e. interest 
expense minus interest income), they are usually not relevant for banks due to 
the high levels of interest income. Summing up, the existing anti-avoidance rules 
tackling debt shifting are not effective for banks even though they also use this 
tax avoidance channel. Therefore, there is a need for specific anti-tax avoidance 
rules in the financial sector. Such rules could, for example, limit the deductibility 
of internal interest payments.
This paper contributes to three different strands of literature. First, it adds to a large 
literature on profit shifting (recently surveyed by Beer et al. 2020). Within this litera-
ture, several papers focus on the use of internal debt, e.g. Fuest et al. (2011), Buettner 
et al. (2012), Buettner and Wamser (2013), Blouin et al. (2014), Egger et al. (2014) and 
4 We discuss the German CFC rule and whether its exemption for banks applies in more detail in 
Sect. 2.1.
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Overesch and Wamser (2014). Similarly to our paper, Overesch and Wamser (2014) 
also use bilateral internal debt data; they also find significantly positive effects of the 
bilateral tax rate differential, the most precise measure for debt shifting incen-
tives. We contribute to this literature in two ways: As a first contribution, we 
point out the importance of modelling conduit entities, showing that the depend-
ent variable should be net (and not gross) internal debt. As a second contribution, 
we focus on banks, an industry where debt financing plays a particularly large 
role.
Second, we contribute to the emerging literature focusing on profit shifting 
in the banking sector. Merz and Overesch (2016) show in a worldwide sample 
of bank affiliates that corporate tax rates are negatively associated with reported 
pre-tax profits, indicating that banks indeed engage in profit shifting. While they 
cannot identify precise profit shifting channels in their data, they find some sug-
gestive evidence that internal debt shifting might play a role. Langenmayr and 
Reiter (2017) identify another potential channel by showing that banks shift prof-
its through the relocation of proprietary trading assets to lower-taxed affiliates.
Lastly, we contribute to the literature studying how taxes affect capital struc-
ture choices in the financial sector. While there is plenty of evidence on how 
taxes affect the capital structures of non-financial firms (see, for example, the 
meta-analysis of Feld et  al. 2013), only a few papers look at the financial sec-
tor, despite the importance of bank leverage as a risk factor for financial crises. 
de  Mooij and Keen (2016) first show analytically that higher tax rates should 
increase both conventional debt as well as hybrid financing in the banking sector, 
a result reflecting the tax deductibility of interest payments. They confirm this 
relationship empirically for conventional debt, but not for hybrid financial instru-
ments. Heckemeyer and de  Mooij (2017) compare the responsiveness of debt 
finance to taxation for banks and non-banks. They find that while small banks 
are more responsive to taxation than non-banks of similar size, large banks are 
less responsive compared to both smaller banks and similarly sized non-banks. 
Gu et  al. (2015) regress overall debt-to-assets ratios on the difference between 
the tax rate an affiliate faces and the group’s average tax rate. As they cannot dis-
tinguish between internal and external debt they also cannot separate this effect 
into internal debt shifting and the classical debt financing incentive. In con-
trast, our focus is on the tax responsiveness of internal debt, which we observe 
directly and at a bilateral level in the Bundesbank data. The presumed underlying 
motive is to shift profits from a high-tax to a low-tax location without increasing 
the indebtedness of the bank group as whole. We will discuss below how this 
decision interacts with the conventional tax shield motive to take on additional 
(external) debt in response to higher tax rates.
The next section discusses relevant institutional issues and the role of conduit 
entities. Section 3 presents the empirical specification that we use for identification. 
Section 4 describes the data and provides descriptive evidence, and Sect. 5 presents 
regression results. Section 6 concludes.
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2  Debt shifting in the banking sector
2.1  Institutional background
Financing in the banking sector relies heavily on debt: Banks usually have little 
equity relative to debt. The Bank for International Settlements reports an equity-
to-total-assets ratio of only 6.9% for banks worldwide in 2015 (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements 2017). German banks, constituting the sample in this paper, had 
on average an equity-to-total-assets ratio of 7.0% in 2015, compared to 28.2% in the 
non-financial sector (Deutsche Bundesbank 2016). Berg and Gider (2017) find that 
different asset risks can largely explain this capitalization gap between banks and 
non-banks. The main outside determinants of banks’ capital structure are taxation 
and regulation, which we will now address in turn.
First, consider taxation. In almost all countries, interest payments on debt are 
tax deductible while dividend payments are not. Thus, the tax system encourages 
the use of debt over equity to finance operations—the debt tax shield or debt bias. 
Thus, third-party debt lowers taxable profits (i.e. the tax base) and therefore implies 
a lower tax burden. Multinational firms, however, have an additional way to use debt 
to lower their tax payments: They can use intra-company lending to shift interest 
payments from affiliates in high-tax countries to affiliates in low-tax countries—debt 
shifting. Internal debt keeps the profits of the bank group as a whole constant, but 
lowers the tax burden by shifting profits to a low-tax country.5
Therefore, the tax consequences of external and internal debt are quite different: 
The first lowers the total tax base, while the second shifts profits from high- to low-tax 
countries. But do the decisions to take on external and internal debt influence each 
other? Møen et al. (2019) model theoretically the optimal choice of internal and exter-
nal debt in a multinational firm. While they base their analysis on a generic model of 
a multinational firm and do not analyse banks, the main motives should be identical 
in the financial sector. A fundamental insight from their analysis is that the choice of 
internal and external debt is independent of each other if each has different costs for the 
firm. These costs are indeed very different: External debt has well-known costs, such 
as the use of debt as a disciplining device for overspending managers, and the need to 
balance indebtedness against the probability of costly bankruptcy. Internal debt neither 
affects the risk of bankruptcy, nor disciplines managers, nor does failure to repay trig-
ger outside enforcement. The costs of internal debt arise, e.g. from compliance costs 
with tax rules, such as thin capitalization rules and/or controlled-foreign-company 
5 The negative inter-bank market rates that arose for certain funds in 2015 could reverse the debt shifting 
incentives as internal loans have to be priced according to the arm’s length principle. Nevertheless, we 
do not expect that negative interest rates have substantially affected debt shifting behaviour of multina-
tional banks so far: Banks have some discretionary powers for overpricing internal loans and they might 
also choose longer time periods to justify higher interest rates. The sample period in our regressions is 
from June 2010 to December 2015. As a robustness check we also estimated our regressions excluding 
all observations in 2015 from the sample and arrived at very similar results.
 F. Reiter et al.
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(CFC) rules.6 Therefore, we treat the decisions to take on internal and external debt as 
separate and focus exclusively on internal debt in this paper.7
We start by discussing the tax rules that may limit debt shifting. Many countries 
have implemented thin-capitalization rules or earnings stripping rules. These rules 
restrict the tax deductibility of interest payments to a certain amount or to a defined 
debt-to-equity ratio. Interest payments exceeding these thresholds do not reduce the 
tax base and therefore make debt shifting less attractive.8 However, most countries 
either exclude banks from the scope of these rules (e.g. Spain and Italy) or apply 
more generous thresholds that effectively exclude banks from the scope (e.g. Japan 
and UK). Germany applies its thin-capitalization rule also to financial corporations. 
However, the restriction of interest deductibility only applies on net interest expenses, 
i.e. total interest expenses net of total interest income. Since interest income is a main 
source of income for financial corporations, the focus on net interest expenses effec-
tively also excludes banks from the scope of the thin capitalization rule. Debt shifting 
may further be less attractive for tax avoidance if the source country levies a with-
holding tax on interest payments. Among affiliates in European countries, there are 
no withholding taxes on interest payments due to the Interest and Royalties Directive 
(Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003). Additionally, most double tax trea-
ties reduce or eliminate the withholding tax on interest payments.
In addition, several countries have controlled-foreign-corporation (CFC) rules 
that add passive income (e.g. interest income) in low-taxed affiliates to the tax base 
of the parent company (see e.g. Ruf and Weichenrieder 2012), allowing for a tax 
credit for the taxes already paid abroad. If binding, these rules would prevent debt 
shifting. However, some countries such as, e.g. Japan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States completely or in large part exclude income from banking from being 
affected by CFC rules. According to the prevailing view,9 also Germany completely 
excludes income from banking under the relatively loose condition of having a 
‘commercially organized business operation’ in the low-tax country.10 This exclu-
sion of banks from CFC legislation in some major countries provides additional 
scope for debt shifting compared to multinationals in other sectors.
Second, let us consider banking regulation. Since a large part of bank regula-
tions addresses the capital structure of a bank, debt shifting may be more difficult 
for banks than for non-financial firms. Merz and Overesch (2016) find evidence 
9 See Blümich and Vogt (2019) Rz. 28. The term prevailing view refers to the most widely held opinion 
in a legal discourse.
10 The German Federal Fiscal Court decided in 2010 that it is not even necessary that the foreign affiliate 
has employees or offices to fulfil the condition of a ‘commercially organized business operation’ (BFH 
13 Oct 2010, I R 61/09); having a service contract with another affiliate is already sufficient.
6 E.g. Mintz and Smart (2004) and Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005) also model the costs of internal debt 
as separable.
7 Of course, an affiliate of a multinational firm may also take on internal debt to profit from the classical 
debt tax shield. The fact that the associated interest payments arrive in another affiliate of the same mul-
tinational instead of third-party debt holders would then be a side effect and not the rationale behind the 
internal debt. Desai et al. (2004) indeed show that in countries with underdeveloped capital markets or 
weak creditor rights, internal debt is a substitute for external debt. This motive, however, should not play 
a role in regressions with bilateral data, where we show that the precise tax rate differential between two 
countries affects internal lending between affiliates in these countries.
8 See e.g. Buettner et al. (2012) and Blouin et al. (2014) for empirical evidence.
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suggesting that capital regulations affect profit shifting activities. In most countries, 
the capital requirements base on Basel III, which implemented a mandatory mini-
mum equity-to-total-assets ratio of 3% in 2018 (with variable mark-ups for globally 
systemically relevant banks).11 At the level of the parent company, the equity-to-
total-assets ratio is calculated on a consolidated basis. Thus, as this ratio contains 
both the equity and the total assets of all consolidated group members, it does not 
constrain internal debt shifting (as long as the consolidated equity-to-total-assets 
ratio fulfils the minimum requirement).12 However, foreign subsidiaries addition-
ally have to fulfil the capital requirements in their home country. In contrast, foreign 
branches are only regulated on a consolidated basis in the home country of the par-
ent company. These rules also apply to Germany, the home country of all multina-
tional banks in our sample.13
Another potential issue at the border of regulation and taxation that might affect 
debt shifting in the banking sector is the implementation of bank levies in several 
countries in the aftermath of the financial crisis. In most countries, internal liabili-
ties are also subject to the levy, increasing the costs of debt shifting. Germany intro-
duced a bank levy in 2011 with progressive tax rates. However, the German levy 
includes a size threshold of 300 million euros, exempting 77% of German banks 
(Buch et al. 2016). Given this exemption of the majority of banks and the relatively 
low bank levy rates (also in other countries, see Devereux et al. 2019, for an over-
view), especially compared to the potential tax savings from internal debt, the Ger-
man levy does not seem to affect debt shifting substantially. Furthermore, since the 
adoption of European bank levy standards in 2015 bank levy rates on intragroup 
liabilities are reduced by half.
2.2  The role of conduit entities
A threat to the empirical identification of internal debt shifting are conduit entities 
that simply pass through liabilities, by taking up a loan from a related affiliate and 
passing it on to another affiliate. In these conduit affiliates interest income from con-
duit claims offsets interest expenses due to conduit liabilities. Thus, using internal 
gross liabilities as proxy for profits shifted out through internal debt leads to biased 
estimates. Nevertheless, previous empirical studies on debt shifting have not consid-
ered the existence of conduit entities and their potential impact on the estimation of 
debt shifting.
11 For a discussion of the Basel III compulsory minimum equity-to-total-assets ratio requirement see 
Dermine (2015).
12 If a banking group also contains non-financial but commercial entities, these investments reduce the 
banks’ capital when calculating the required ratios if certain materiality thresholds are fulfilled, see Bas 
(2006).
13 In Germany, financial institutions are supervised by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
(BaFin) and the Bundesbank. The German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz, KWG) complemented by 
European law [especially Directive 2013/36/EU on Capital Requirements (Capital Requirements Direc-
tive CRD IV) and Regulation (EU) 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and 
investment firms (Capital Requirements Regulation)] determine the core regulations applicable to Ger-
man banks. In line with Basel III, these German regulations require a minimum consolidated equity-to-
total-assets ratio of 3% and do not target internal debt shifting.
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This paper accounts for conduit entities in internal debt financing. We define con-
duit affiliates as entities that simply pass-through debt from one related affiliate to 
another affiliate. Figure 1 illustrates the simplest example of such an internal conduit 
debt scheme: The tax haven affiliate faces a corporate tax rate equal to tHa and lends 
KC units of money to the conduit affiliate which is taxed by tC > tHa . Through the 
related interest payments profits are shifted from the conduit affiliate to the tax haven 
affiliate. Moreover, also the headquarter wants to borrow KHQ from the tax haven 
affiliate. Instead of directly taking out a loan from the haven affiliate, it can channel 
this loan via the conduit affiliate. In the headquarter the interest payments for KHQ 
are tax-deductible. In the conduit entity the pass-through is completely tax-neutral 
(assuming that the loans are subject to the same interest rates) as interest expenses to 
the haven affiliate offset the interest income from the headquarter. In the tax haven 
affiliate interest income is taxed at rate tHa < tHQ . Hence, from a tax perspective, tak-
ing out the loan through the conduit entity is equivalent to direct lending.
While passing the loan through the conduit entity is neutral regarding the tax 
treatment, it may be preferable for several reasons. First, additional debt streams 
offer additional scope for mispricing of internal loans. This form of transfer pricing 
is a profit shifting channel different from internal debt shifting and is not the subject 
of this paper. Second, passing internal debt through conduit subsidiaries can simply 
reflect real structures: the conduit entity can serve as a financial hub that plays the 
role of a capital coordinator for the group and distributes capital from tax havens to 
affiliates. This also allows to re-bundle debt, for instance by taking out loans from 
several low-taxed subsidiaries and distributing them to several high-taxed affiliates 
through the hub. Third, multinationals might also use conduit entities to conceal the 
real origin of internal loans. As tax avoidance schemes of several multinationals 
were recently addressed in the media, multinationals might be interested in making 
these schemes increasingly opaque, although they are legal. Additionally, tax admin-
istrations may focus on loans directly from tax havens, and are less likely to check 
in detail loans from a conduit country, as the pass-through nature of these loans is 
hidden from them. Thus, the use of conduits may lower the probability of detailed 
checks by the tax administration.
How does the use of conduit subsidiaries affect the estimation of internal debt 
responses to tax rates? In the simple example in Fig.  1, passing KHQ through the 
conduit affiliate increases the internal debt levels of both the conduit affiliate and 
the headquarter. However, KHQ does not shift any profit out of the conduit affiliate. 
This double-counting of internal debt effectively assigns artificially high internal 
debt levels to these conduit entities. If the location of the conduit is correlated with 
tax rates, this leads to a bias in classical debt shifting regressions employed in earlier 
literature (which uses internal liabilities as the dependent variable). In Sect. 3.2 we 
elaborate on the sign of this bias.
Apart from internal debt shifting, some studies consider the use of conduit enti-
ties by multinationals in different contexts. Mintz (2004) models that multination-
als give equity to a low-taxed conduit entity which then passes the capital as a 
loan to another higher-taxed affiliate. While the first transaction in most countries 
is not related with profit shifting (as dividends are usually largely tax-exempt), the 
loan shifts profits from the high-taxed affiliate to the lower-taxed conduit entity. 
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Johannesen (2014) models how conduit entities can be used for cross-border hybrid 
instruments intended to avoid taxes. Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) empirically 
investigate factors determining why multinationals might use intermediate enti-
ties for investing in their subsidiaries. In the same direction, Garcia-Bernardo et al. 
(2017) identify five countries that are most important for passing-through invest-
ments. Dyreng et  al. (2015) find that U.S. multinationals systematically supply 
equity to their subsidiaries through conduit entities located in countries with low 
taxes on equity distributions. Literature on internal debt shifting so far has not con-
sidered the use of conduit entities.
In addition to these tax-related reasons for using conduit entities, banks also use 
conduit entities for non-tax reasons. First, multinational banks use such financial 
networks to manage liquidity. Cocco et al. (2009), e.g. find that banks with a larger 
imbalance in their reserve deposits tend to borrow funds from related banks and pay 
a lower interest rate on these funds than they would pay on funds from non-related 
banks. Second, multinational banks use their financial network to allocate systemic 
risk within the bank. Elliott et al. (2014), e.g. find that a more diversified financial 
network provides a better insurance against the failure of one specific bank in the 
network.
3  Empirical specification
This section develops the baseline empirical specification to estimate internal debt 
shifting, first with the classical dependent variable used in previous literature and 
afterwards with the new variable that accounts for conduit debt. In Sect. 3.3 we then 
adapt the empirical specification to bilateral internal debt data.
3.1  Baseline model
Analogously to earlier literature on internal debt shifting in non-financial sectors, we 
first estimate the effect of corporate tax rates on internal debt-to-asset ratios, using 
variation in tax rates within a multinational bank group across countries and across 
time. Accordingly, the baseline regression equation is
where InternalLiabilitiesikt are internal liabilities in affiliate i of bank group k in 
period t. We assume that these internal liabilities refer to plain vanilla debt which 
classifies as debt for tax purposes in all involved countries.14 TAikt are total assets. 
CTRikt is the statutory corporate income tax rate affecting affiliate i and Xikt is a 
(1)
InternalLiabilitiesikt
TAikt
= 훽0 + 훽1CTRikt + 훽2Xikt + 훾t + 훿k + uikt,
14 If internal liabilities contained hybrid financial instruments to some extent, affiliate i could still deduct 
the resulting interest payments for tax purposes. Additionally, the parent company would receive tax 
exempt dividend income. In this case, we would overestimate the effect on internal lending in favour of 
tax avoidance with hybrid financial instruments.
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vector of control variables described below. 훾t are time fixed effects, 훿k are bank 
group fixed effects and uikt is the error term. If multinational banks indeed shift prof-
its via internal debt, we expect a positive estimate for 훽1.
To capture the size of an affiliate, we include the natural logarithm of total assets 
as a bank-specific control variable into Xikt.15 Earlier literature uses further subsid-
iary-level controls such as collateral, tangibility, payroll expenses, and off-balance 
sheet items to decrease the variance.16 We are unable to do so as our dataset does not 
include this information. As these subsidiary-level control variables are supposed to 
proxy for the capacity to take on external debt and to give collateral, they are clearly 
relevant for analysing the overall debt-to-asset ratio of a bank. However, their influ-
ence on internal debt is less clear. We thus find omitted variable bias unlikely to 
arise from the omission of these variables.
As the magnitude of a bank group’s engagement in a country and thereby also the 
use of internal debt might be influenced by the macroeconomic situation, we further 
control for GDP growth, consumer price inflation rates and the natural logarithm of 
the host country’s nominal GDP. A further control is a country’s share of the finan-
cial sector in its gross value added, which should account for countries that act as 
important financial centres.
Moreover, we include two regulatory variables that potentially influence a bank 
group’s activities and financing decisions in a country: First we incorporate the min-
imum regulatory capital requirement for banks and second we control for the capital 
regulatory index that is provided by Barth et al. (2013) based on the World Bank 
(2011) survey on bank regulation. This index captures whether a country’s capital 
requirement is adjusted for individual risks of banks, whether the regulatory capital 
is adjusted for certain market value losses, and whether certain funds may be used 
to capitalize a bank. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater 
stringency of capital regulation. These variables also indirectly control for financial 
networks that are set up in response to regulatory requirements.
HQ
(tHQ) KHQ
KC + KHQConduit
(tC) 
Haven
(tHa) 
Fig. 1  Conduit affiliate in internal debt financing
15 In additional tests, we control for the growth rate of a subsidiary measured by the annual change 
in total assets (following Merz and Overesch 2016). Adding this control variable does not change our 
results.
16 See e.g. Merz and Overesch (2016) and Heckemeyer and de Mooij (2017).
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Another issue with the sample in this paper is that all bank groups are headquartered 
in Germany. As profit shifting is found to be less intense out of headquarters (see Dis-
chinger et al. 2014), as a robustness check we also exclude all German headquarters 
from the sample and re-estimate the regressions. The results we find are very similar.
3.2  Accounting for conduit entities
As outlined in Sect. 2.2, the simple internal-liabilities-to-total-assets ratio also includes 
conduit liabilities that are only passed through and hence do not reflect actual profit 
shifting. To solely capture internal debt that effectively shifts profits out of the respec-
tive affiliate, we have to subtract such pass-through loans: The ratio of internal debt 
net of pass-through loans divided by i’s total assets is the appropriate measure for debt 
shifting out of affiliate i. A straightforward debt shifting regression with this ratio as 
dependent variable is
Here InternalDebt∗
ikt
 denotes internal debt net of pass-through loans, and the other 
variables are as defined above. Previous internal debt shifting regressions, as in 
regression equation (1), do not subtract pass-through loans in the dependent varia-
ble: The common dependent variable is InternalLiabilitiesikt
TAikt
=
InternalDebt∗
ikt
+eikt
TAikt
 , where eikt 
is debt that is passed through to other affiliates. The regressions therefore estimate
If the choice of the conduit affiliate’s location is correlated with the corporate tax 
rate, there is a bias in the estimate for 훽1 similar to the bias that arises with a system-
atic measurement error in the dependent variable. As pass-through debt always 
increases the amount of internal gross liabilities, the correlation between the 
dependent variable in Eq. (3) and eikt
TAikt
 is positive by definition. Therefore, the sign of 
the bias is equal to the sign of the covariance between eikt
TAikt
 (the ‘left-out variable’ 
here) and CTRikt:
where N is the number of affiliates, T is the number of sample periods and CTR is 
the sample mean of CTRit . For the sake of brevity we drop the bank group indicator 
k from here on, as it is fully included in the bank indicator i. In all subsidiaries that 
do not serve as conduit entities eit is equal to zero. Therefore, one can rewrite (4):
(2)
InternalDebt∗
ikt
TAikt
= 훽0 + 훽1CTRikt + 훽2Xikt + 훾t + 훿k + uikt .
(3)
InternalLiabilitiesikt
TAikt
= 훽0 + 훽1CTRikt + 훽2Xikt + 훾t + 훿k + uikt +
eikt
TAikt
.
(4)
Cov(CTRit,
eit
TAit
) =
1
T
1
N
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
(
CTRit ∗
eit
TAit
)
− CTR ∗
1
T
1
N
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
(
eit
TAit
)
,
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where subsidiaries i = 1,… ,H (with H ≤ N ) serve as conduit affiliates. Rearrang-
ing gives
Equation (6) is negative if the weighted average tax rate of conduit affiliates is lower 
than the average tax rate of all affiliates in the sample, with weights being equal to 
the pass-through-debt-to-total-assets ratio eit
TAit
 . Hence, if conduit entities systemati-
cally face lower tax rates than the average of affiliates, classical debt shifting regres-
sions estimate a downward biased coefficient for the corporate tax rate. If conduit 
entities are, vice versa, located in higher-taxed affiliates, there is an upward bias in 
estimates for 훽1 in Eq. (3). As Sect. 4.2 shows, banks in our sample locate their con-
duit entities systematically in low-tax countries, resulting in a downward biased esti-
mate for 훽1 when using the classical dependent variable.
To account for the use of conduit affiliates in internal debt financing, we addi-
tionally use internal net debt (relative to total assets) as the dependent variable. 
This variable is defined as
where InternalLiabilitiesikt denotes affiliate i’s internal liabilities and 
InternalClaimsikt are claims to related parties of bank group k in period t. Therefore, 
the difference is the effective amount of internal debt that shifts profits out of affili-
ate i, accounting for the potential existence of conduit debt. If internal claims of an 
affiliate are larger than its internal liabilities, effectively no profits are shifted out via 
the internal debt channel and IntNetDebtikt is zero. The empirical specification for 
estimation with the ratio of IntNetDebtikt to total assets as the dependent variable is 
equivalent to Eq. (1):
The explanatory variables are as defined in Sect.  3.1. With internal debt shifting 
we expect a positive estimate for 훽1 in Eq. (8). As argued above, the estimated tax 
rate coefficient is expected to be higher with internal net debt as the dependent var-
iable compared to internal liabilities if the conduit entities are located in low-tax 
countries, and to be lower if conduit affiliates are located in high-tax countries. As a 
robustness check we again re-estimate equation (8) with exclusion of German head-
quarters to account for the sample’s idiosyncrasy that all bank groups are headquar-
tered in Germany.
Another issue is that country characteristics other than the corporate tax rate 
influence a bank affiliate’s volume of internal net debt. To account for this, we 
(5)
Cov(CTRit,
eit
TAit
) =
1
T
1
N
T∑
t=1
H∑
i=1
(
CTRit ∗
eit
TAit
)
− CTR ∗
1
T
1
N
T∑
t=1
H∑
i=1
(
eit
TAit
)
,
(6)Cov
(
CTRit,
eit
TAit
)
=
1
T
1
N
T∑
t=1
H∑
i=1
[(
CTRit − CTR
)
∗
eit
TAit
)]
.
(7)IntNetDebtikt = max(InternalLiabilitiesikt − InternalClaimsikt; 0),
(8)
IntNetDebtikt
TAikt
= 훽0 + 훽1CTRikt + 훽2Xikt + 훾t + 훿k + uikt .
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conduct a robustness check by additionally including bank affiliate fixed effects 
into regression equation (8). We then only exploit corporate tax rate changes in 
the sample period to identify the tax effect on internal debt, measuring basically 
how banks adjust the volume of effectively profit-shifting debt in response to 
changes in the corporate tax rate.
As stated in Sect. 2.2, there are other, non-tax reasons for intrafirm lending within a 
multinational bank. Since we do not have data on liquidity or risk allocation, we can-
not control for these factors in our model. The change in tax rates should, however, not 
affect the attractiveness of a conduit entity in these other dimensions. Therefore, inso-
far as these factors are constant over time (or changes are not correlated with tax rate 
changes), in the specifications with affiliate fixed-effects, we effectively control for such 
non-tax related determinants of internal debt.
Lastly, note that while our focus in this paper is on internal debt, similar problems 
may occur when studying total debt. Consider, for example, a case where a conduit 
entity takes on external debt and passes it on internally to the affiliate. In this case, 
we observe increasing external (or total) debt (and internal claims) at the level of the 
conduit, and internal liabilities (and external claims, if the money is lent to customers) 
at the level of the subsidiary. Internal debt is not double counted, but total debt is: The 
same financial flow shows up as (external) debt for the conduit, and as (internal) debt at 
the subsidiary. Both are part of total debt in unconsolidated data.
3.3  Bilateral regressions
Starting from June 2014, the External Positions of Banks database of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2015) also splits up internal liabilities and internal loans by the country 
of the related affiliate from which the loan is taken or to which the loan is given. This 
allows to regress bilateral internal net debt on precise bilateral tax rate differentials that 
unambiguously identify the tax incentive to shift profits between two affiliates. For a 
subset of German non-financial multinationals, Overesch and Wamser (2014) show a 
positive effect of such precise tax rate differentials on bilateral debt stocks. So far no 
study has used bilateral data for estimating debt shifting in banks. Here we use internal 
liabilities net of internal claims that affiliate i takes out from related affiliates in country 
j as our dependent variable:
where InternalLiabilitiesijkt are liabilities of affiliate i to other affiliates of the same 
bank group k in country j and InternalClaimsijkt are claims of affiliate i to related 
affiliates in country j. We then estimate the following equation for the full sample of 
German multinational banks and their foreign affiliates:
The main variable of interest is CTRikt − CTRjkt which denotes the bilateral tax rate 
differential between the host country of affiliate i and the country of the internal 
(9)IntNetDebtijkt = max(InternalLiabilitiesijkt − InternalClaimsijkt; 0),
(10)
IntNetDebtijkt
TAikt
= 훽0 + 훽1(CTRikt − CTRjkt) + 훽2Xikt + 훽3Yjkt + 훾t + 훿k + uijkt .
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creditor j. Xikt is the same vector of control variables as above. Yjkt contains the 
macroeconomic control variables also for the internal net creditor’s country. 훾t are 
monthly time fixed effects and 훿k are bank group fixed effects. uijkt is the error term. 
Under the hypothesis that banks shift profits from higher-taxed to lower-taxed affili-
ates via internal debt we expect a positive estimate for 훽1 . Also in this bilateral set-
ting we include bank affiliate fixed effects as a robustness check.
4  Data and descriptives
4.1  Data
We use the External Position of Banks database of the Deutsche Bundesbank 
(2015), a unique dataset provided by the German central bank on assets and liabili-
ties in foreign affiliates of German multinational banks and in the respective Ger-
man headquarters. As this is an administrative dataset to which all German banks 
with foreign activities are obliged to report monthly, it provides a complete and high 
quality sample of all German multinational banks. We observe separate records 
for all subsidiaries, whereas for branches we observe an aggregate figure per bank 
group and country.
As dependent variables we use internal liabilities held in an affiliate, and internal 
net debt which is calculated from internal liabilities and internal claims data. For 
the estimation of Eqs. (1) and (8), these variables are available from June 2010 to 
December 2015 on a monthly basis. More precise data on bilateral internal loans 
and liabilities, separated by the country of the internal counterpart, are available 
from July 2014 until December 2015. Although the sample period for this bilat-
eral data is relatively short, the variation over affiliate/counterparty-country-pairs 
and over time allows the estimation of Eq. (10) and an identification of the effect 
of precise corporate tax rate differentials on bilateral internal net debt.
The literature on internal debt shifting usually scales internal debt by total 
assets. As data on total assets is not available, we proxy total assets by total exter-
nal assets, which comprise claims against non-residents as well as money market 
papers, bonds, and shares issued by non-residents.17 To control for an affiliate’s 
size, we take the natural logarithm of total external assets as a bank-level control 
variable. We collect the statutory corporate tax rates on a monthly basis from 
the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides of Ernst & Young (2011, 2014). We take 
country-level controls from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Interna-
tional Financial Statistics, the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics 
and the online data centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). For some countries we have to complement the data with 
information provided by national statistical offices (see Appendix “Variable defi-
nitions” section for an overview of variables and data sources). As nominal GDP is 
17 Claims against the German headquarter are included in the external claims. We discuss below the 
implications of using external assets instead of total assets for the interpretation of the results.
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only available quarterly, we transform it to monthly frequency with the proportional 
Denton method for flow series as described in Bloem et al. (2001). Also the share of 
the financial sector in a country’s gross value added is only available with quarterly 
frequency and we transform it to monthly frequency by cubic spline interpolation. 
To calculate annual GDP growth rates with monthly frequency, we use interpolated 
GDP values. Minimum capital requirements are taken from the World Bank (2011) 
survey on bank regulation. Based on several other questions in this survey, Barth 
et al. (2013) provide an index on the stringency of capital regulation. As the World 
Bank provided the most recent version of the survey only in 2011, in our sample 
these two variables are constant over time. Table 1 shows the basic descriptive sta-
tistics of all variables.
4.2  Descriptive analysis
Figure 2 illustrates the geographical distribution of German bank affiliates.18 Most affil-
iates are located in Europe, probably due to the proximity to the home country and 
the common regulation in the European banking union that facilitates foreign activi-
ties. The most important foreign market for German banks is Luxembourg with 42 
affiliates, followed by the United Kingdom with 32 affiliates (in 2013). Outside Europe 
the United States (20 affiliates) and Singapore (19 affiliates) are the most important 
markets.
Furthermore, Fig. 2 illustrates the location of the top 5 countries for conduit debt, 
defined as the sum of each bank affiliate’s min(InternalClaimsit;InternalLiabilitiesit) 
per country. First note that these most important conduit countries are distributed 
around the world, suggesting that they serve as regional hubs for different world 
regions in which German banks are active. Second, three of the five most important 
conduit countries (Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, Singapore) are classified as tax 
havens by both Dharmapala and Hines (2009) and Johannesen and Zucman (2014), 
and also the United Kingdom (the most important conduit country) offers a relatively 
low tax rate. This observation already suggests that in the sample of German multina-
tional banks conduit entities tend to be located in low-tax countries. The high amount 
of conduit debt in the United States probably reflects the important role of this finan-
cial market. Note that also conduit entities in the United States may face lower effec-
tive tax rates than the average U.S. tax rate, as banks can locate their foreign affili-
ates in Delaware, a well known domestic tax haven in the United States (Dyreng et al. 
2013).19
18 Note that in the External Positions of Banks database of the Deutsche Bundesbank (2015) we observe 
all subsidiaries of German banks separately. However, we cannot distinguish between different branches 
of German banks in a country as there is only one aggregate observation per bank group, country and 
month for branches. We therefore count all branches of a bank group in a country as one single affiliate, 
whereas all subsidiaries are counted separately.
19 We do not observe the precise locations of bank affiliates in a country. Therefore, this study assigns 
to each affiliate in the United States the relatively high average US corporate tax rate, although affiliates 
might be located in states with low state-level taxes. If German banks systematically locate their affiliates 
in low-tax states, our results underestimate internal debt shifting.
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For a further descriptive investigation of the use of internal debt, Table 2 ranks 
countries according to the mean of the internal debt-to-assets ratios of German bank 
affiliates in the respective country in 2013. As expected there are several high-tax 
countries at the top. German bank affiliates in Japan (corporate tax rate of 38.0% in 
2013) had the highest internal debt-to-asset ratios (88.6% on average). Also the inter-
nal debt-to-assets ratio of German bank affiliates in France and Spain (two further 
high-tax countries) are on a relatively high level around 80%. Also some tax havens 
appear in the ranking: German bank affiliates in Hong Kong have a similar internal 
debt ratio as in Portugal, despite the substantially lower corporate tax rate that would 
suggest that banks shift profits into affiliates in Hong Kong rather than out of them. 
The last column in Table 2 explains this finding: It reports for each country the 
average conduit share in internal debt that is passed through an affiliate (formally 
defined as the country average of min
[
InternalClaimsit
InternalLiabilitiesit
; 1
]
 in each affiliate). In Hong 
Kong on average 94.9% of internal liabilities are merely passed through the affili-
ates, whereas in Portugal the average conduit share is only 25.7%. Hence, even 
though German banks have similar internal debt ratios in both countries, the tax-
effective internal debt ratio is substantially higher in Portugal. Also bank affili-
ates in Singapore and the Cayman Islands have similar internal debt ratios as 
affiliates in high-tax countries (e.g. Italy), which can be explained with substan-
tially larger conduit shares of internal debt.
Both Fig. 2 and Table 2 suggest that the conduit affiliates in the sample of Ger-
man multinational banks tend to be located in tax havens and low-tax countries, 
implying an underestimation of debt shifting with the classical dependent vari-
able (the internal-liabilities-to-total-assets ratio). Regressing the conduit share of 
internal debt in an affiliate on the corporate tax rate and controlling for other 
macroeconomic variables (see regression results in Appendix  “Conduit share 
regressions”) indeed leads to a significantly negative tax coefficient. Hence, in 
the sample used in this paper, the conduit entities are systematically located in 
low-tax countries. From a debt shifting perspective this assigns too high internal 
liabilities to low-taxed affiliates, leading to an underestimation of internal debt 
shifting with the classical internal-liabilities-to-total-assets ratio as the dependent 
variable. We therefore expect a larger tax coefficient with the internal-net-debt-to-
total-assets ratio as the dependent variable.
We now turn to some descriptives for our newly constructed dependent vari-
able, internal net debt. Figure 3 depicts the development of internal net debt in 
our data over time. The share of internal net debt to total assets is relatively stable 
over the observation period and amounts to approximately 20%. Bilateral streams 
of internal net debt are largest between German headquarters and their subsidiar-
ies/branches in Germany, France, the Cayman Islands, the Netherlands, and Spain 
(see Table 3). Therefore, internal net debt is especially relevant both in countries 
with many affiliates (see also Table 2) and in an important tax haven country.
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5  Results
Table  4 shows the baseline estimation results for the determinants of the internal 
debt variables in affiliates and headquarters of German multinational banks. For 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics
Total assets refer to total external assets including claims against non-residents as well as money market 
papers, bonds, and shares issued by non-residents. Internal net debt are internal liabilities net of internal 
loans if positive and zero otherwise. M and Q indicate monthly and quarterly frequency, respectively. Quar-
terly nominal GDP is transformed to monthly frequency with the proportional Denton method for flow data. 
Monthly GDP growth is calculated from interpolated GDP values. Financial sector share denotes the share of 
the finance and insurance sector in a country’s gross value added. Monthly frequency is calculated by cubic 
spline interpolation. Regulatory index is an index for the stringency of capital regulation in a country, ranging 
from 0 to 10 (higher values indicating greater stringency). Sources: See Appendix “Variable definitions”
Variable Obs. Mean SD p5 p50 p95 Frequ.
Aggregate data (06/2010–12/2015)
Internal liabilities/total assets 21,896 0.424 0.414 0.000 0.285 1.000 M
Internal net debt/total assets 21,896 0.280 0.381 0.000 0.005 1.000 M
Total assets (in million €) 21,896 8093 32,269 1 1 32,878 M
Statutory corporate tax rate 21,896 0.264 0.073 0.165 0.292 0.369 M
Nominal GDP (in billion €) 21,896 151 210 3 92 370 Q → M
Inflation rate (%) 21,896 1.912 2.472 − 0.399 1.654 5.102 M
GDP growth (%) 21,896 2.102 2.699 − 1.382 1.756 6.264 Q → M
Financial sector share 21,896 0.090 0.086 0.039 0.053 0.280 Q → M
Capital requirement 21,896 0.082 0.007 0.080 0.080 0.100 –
Regulatory index 21,896 6.956 1.734 3.000 8.000 9.000 –
Bilateral data (07/2014–12/2015)
Bilateral internal net debt/total assets 107,361 0.019 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.004 M
Corporate tax rate differential 107,361 0.022 0.100 − 0.150 0.021 0.174 M
Fig. 2  Number of affiliates shown by different shades; top 5 conduit countries marked in the map, with 
the sum of conduit debt held by German bank affiliates in the respective country in parentheses (defined 
as min(InternalClaims
it
;InternalLiabilities
it
) per affiliate). Own calculations from data of the External 
Positions of Banks database of Deutsche Bundesbank (2015)
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Table 2  Intragroup liabilities 
in 2013
CTR denotes a country’s statutory corporate income tax rate in 
2013. Column 3 reports the average gross internal liabilities-to-total 
external assets ratio of German bank affiliates in the respective coun-
try. Column 4 contains the average conduit share of internal debt, 
defined as the country average of min( InternalClaimsit
InternalLiabilitiesit
; 1) in each affil-
iate. Due to confidentiality requirements, only countries with at least 
3 affiliates are listed. Source: Ernst & Young (2011, 2014) and 
External Positions of Banks database of Deutsche Bundesbank 
(2015), own calculations
Country CTR (%) Internal Liabilities/
TA (%)
Conduit 
share (%)
Japan 38.0 88.6 20.8
France 34.0 83.8 22.3
Spain 30.0 79.2 7.7
United Kingdom 23.0 75.1 43.8
Greece 26.0 74.4 38.8
Hong Kong 16.5 72.6 94.9
Portugal 25.0 70.9 25.7
Sweden 22.0 70.7 50.1
Belgium 34.0 69.6 32.1
Singapore 17.0 67.0 59.0
Italy 40.7 65.2 13.1
Cayman Islands 0.0 63.2 68.3
United States 39.1 61.1 36.8
China 25.0 57.2 16.1
…
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Fig. 3  Average of internal net debt over time. For comparison, the average of internal liabilities divided 
by total assets in 2010 is 0.37. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2015), own calculations
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comparability with previous studies, the dependent variable in column (1) is the 
ratio of internal liabilities to total (external) assets. We find a significant positive 
coefficient of 0.508 for the corporate tax rate, indicating that a 10 percentage points 
higher corporate tax rate implies an increase in the internal liabilities to total assets 
ratio by about five percentage points. At the mean (42.4%) this corresponds to an 
increase by 12%. This effect of corporate tax rates on internal liabilities in the bank-
ing sector is quantitatively larger than previous studies estimated for other sectors 
relative to the sample mean: Fuest et  al. (2011) and Buettner et  al. (2012) use a 
similar setting with data on German multinationals and find coefficients for the cor-
porate tax rate of only 0.177 and 0.214, respectively. A 10 percentage points tax rate 
increase in these studies implies at the sample means (23% and 28%) an increase 
in the internal debt ratio by around 7% to 8%. One caveat in the comparison of our 
results to previous studies is that we have to approximate total assets by total exter-
nal assets. As we compare changes at the mean, this approximation is innocuous if 
the ratio of total external assets to total assets remains constant over time.
We can also compare our results to the literature on the effect of taxes on banks’ 
capital structure. This literature finds marginal effects of the tax rate on the total 
debt-to-assets ratio between 0.25 and 0.3 (Gu et al. 2015; de Mooij and Keen 2016). 
In further analyses, de Mooij and Keen (2016) show that the tax effect is twice as 
large after 2007; Heckemeyer and de Mooij (2017) find that small banks react much 
more strongly than larger banks.20 Whereas estimates on the total debt ratio and on 
internal debt are not directly comparable, a comparison with these results also sug-
gests that banks’ internal debt reacts particularly strongly to taxation.21
Table 3  Internal net debt: 
largest bilateral streams
Average internal net debt-to-external assets ratio between German 
bank affiliates in the listed countries and their German headquarter 
for the five countries with the largest values. Source: Deutsche Bun-
desbank (2015), own calculations
Country Internal net debt (%)
Germany 40.90
France 26.52
Cayman Islands 25.90
Netherlands 25.69
Spain 25.21
20 This observed heterogeneity among banks may also partially explain why we find a relatively strong 
response, as our dataset covers both a later period as these other studies, and also more small banks (in 
contrast to the commercially available datasets used in the papers cited above, our dataset provides full 
coverage of all German banks with foreign affiliates, no matter how small).
21 We also estimated the regressions using the ratio of third-party debt to total assets as the dependent 
variable. However, the results are very imprecisely estimated. For example, in our main specification 
(col. (7) of Table 4), the 95%-confidence interval is [− 0.009; 6.330]. Therefore, we cannot compare this 
result to other studies investigating the effect of taxes on total leverage. This may be due to the fact that 
we are unable to include further bank-level control variables in our estimations, which are much more 
relevant for third-party debt than for internal debt (see Sect. 3.1).
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The greater impact of tax rates on internal debt in the financial sector becomes 
even clearer if we use internal net debt as the dependent variable in column (2). This 
variable reflects the effective amount of debt that shifts profits out of an affiliate. 
As shown in the previous section, as conduit entities in internal debt financing are 
mainly located in low-tax countries, ignoring conduit debt results in a downward 
biased estimate of the tax coefficient when using internal gross liabilities as proxy 
for debt shifting. The tax coefficient in column (2) is 0.565, which is about 11% 
Table 4  Baseline intragroup debt regressions
Dependent variable is the ratio of internal liabilities to total external assets in columns (1) and (4) and 
the ratio of internal net debt (internal liabilities net of internal claims if positive, zero otherwise) to total 
external assets in the other columns. groupCTR is the average tax rate of the bank group. Fin. sector 
share is the share of the banking and insurance sector in a country’s gross value added. Reg. index cap-
tures the stringency of capital regulation in a country, ranging from 0 to 10 (higher values indicating 
greater stringency). Cap. req. is the legal minimum capital requirement for banks in a country. Standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered by bank and by country-month. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10% levels. Regressions based on monthly data for 06/2010–12/2015 from the External Positions of 
Banks database of Deutsche Bundesbank (2015)
Sample All entities Foreign affiliates
Dep. var. IntNetDebt
TA
IntNetDebt
TA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CTR 0.508* 0.565** 0.363** 0.468* 0.511** 0.344**
(0.270) (0.225) (0.146) (0.265) (0.214) (0.151)
GroupCTR − 0.540** − 1.036***
(0.219) (0.252)
Ln(TA) − 0.024*** − 0.015*** 0.009** 0.006* − 0.004 0.006 0.016*** 0.013***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Ln(GDP) 0.019 − 0.000 0.010 − 0.006 0.022 0.000 0.020 0.007
(0.015) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.011) (0.024) (0.024)
Inflation − 0.007* − 0.005** − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.013*** − 0.008*** 0.000 − 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
GDP 
growth
− 0.010** − 0.008** − 0.001 − 0.001* − 0.011*** − 0.009*** − 0.001 − 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Fin. sector 
share
0.879*** 0.102 1.409*** 1.552*** 0.495 − 0.285 1.543*** 1.744***
(0.318) (0.230) (0.225) (0.239) (0.310) (0.219) (0.227) (0.242)
Reg. index − 0.018** − 0.005 0.003 0.018***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Cap. req. 0.221 1.256 − 0.544 − 0.544
(2.735) (1.975) (2.451) (1.775)
Time FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Bank 
group 
FE
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Bank FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
R2 0.359 0.332 0.799 0.795 0.403 0.484 0.781 0.777
Observa-
tions
21,896 21,896 21,893 21,884 16,187 16,187 16,184 16,181
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larger than the estimate in column (1). A Wald test shows that the coefficient esti-
mate in column (2) is significantly larger than the coefficient estimate in column (1) 
at a significance level of 10%. While the relatively low significance level implies 
that one should interpret this result cautiously, it does nevertheless suggest that 
using internal net debt as the dependent variable tends to provide stronger results 
than using the traditional internal liabilities variable. At the sample mean (28.0%), 
a 10 percentage points higher corporate tax rate implies an increase in the internal-
net-debt-to-total-assets ratio by 20%. Previous literature has not analysed the tax 
response of internal net debt, and therefore comparability to non-financial sectors is 
limited in column (2). However, as also non-banks use conduit entities (e.g. internal 
financing hubs), accounting for conduit debt is an interesting extension for future 
research on debt shifting in non-financial sectors.
In column (3) we additionally include bank affiliate fixed effects. Qualitatively we 
can confirm that multinational banks shift profits through the use of internal debt; 
however the estimated coefficient is smaller. As fixed effects models assume that the 
full effect of a tax rate change on internal debt takes place within the same period, 
the smaller coefficient may indicate that banks respond more slowly.22 In addition, 
the fixed effects specification uses only tax rate changes for identification, and the 
bulk of these changes took place in high-tax countries. As tax havens (the potential 
destinations for profits) still offer a much lower tax rate (but did not change their 
tax rate), the tax incentive for internal debt structures often changes little if only 
countries with medium or high tax rates make changes. This results in relatively 
low adjustments to tax rate changes (see also Davies et al. 2018). Still, the estimated 
coefficient indicates a strong response of internal net debt to corporate tax rates: A 
ten percentage points rise in the tax rate implies an increase in the internal net debt 
ratio by 3.63 percentage points, corresponding to an increase by about 13% at the 
sample mean.
Instead of the tax rate affiliate i is facing, in column (4) we use the average tax 
rate in the bank group as our main explanatory variable. Relying on variation in 
foreign taxation allows us to more carefully disentangle profit shifting from tax debt 
shielding. The group tax coefficient in column (4) is negative and statistically signif-
icant, indicating that an increase in the average group tax rate lowers internal debt. If 
the average group tax rate increases, shifted profits are on average taxed at a higher 
rate, reducing the incentive to increase internal lending for profit shifting.
Columns (5) to (8) show the results of re-estimating the four specifications 
with exclusion of German headquarters. This accounts for the idiosyncrasy of the 
External Positions of Banks database that all headquarters reside in Germany, and 
Dischinger et  al. (2014) show that multinationals might be reluctant to shift prof-
its away from headquarters. However, we find smaller tax coefficients (0.468, 0.511 
22 Additionally, the noise-to-effect ratio is higher in the fixed effects model, so that measurement error in 
the variables (which may arise e.g. due to book-tax differences) leads to more attenuation bias.
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Table 5  Bilateral regression results
Sample All entities Foreign affiliates
Dep. var. IntNetDebtijt
TAi
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CTRit − CTRjt 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.059*** 0.094***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Ln(Total assets) − 0.009*** − 0.008*** − 0.005*** − 0.008***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Ln(GDP)
 Host country i 0.002*** 0.005 0.001 0.005
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007)
 Counterpart j 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inflation rate
 Host country i − 0.002*** − 0.001** − 0.002*** − 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 Counterpart j − 0.001*** − 0.001*** − 0.001*** − 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growth
 Host country i − 0.001*** − 0.000** − 0.001*** − 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 Counterpart j − 0.001*** − 0.001*** − 0.002*** − 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regulatory index
 Host country i − 0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
 Counterpart j 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital requirement
 Host country i 0.453*** 0.397***
(0.079) (0.072)
 Counterpart j − 0.344*** − 0.281*** − 0.375*** − 0.365***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.036) (0.035)
Financial sector share
 Host country i 0.077*** − 0.143*** 0.067*** − 0.161**
(0.012) (0.053) (0.012) (0.063)
 Counterpart j 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.045*** 0.038***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)
Monthly time FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Bank group FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Bank FE ✓ ✓
R2 0.078 0.231 0.146 0.241
Observations 107,361 107,361 57,628 57,628
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and 0.344) when excluding headquarters from our sample of German multinational 
banks. There are several potential explanations for this finding: First, banks might 
use debt shifting to substantially shift profits out of their German headquarters. This 
would be in line with Tørsløv et al. (2020) who show that the share of corporate tax 
revenues lost due to profit shifting in Germany is the highest among all European 
countries. Second, headquarters partially finance their foreign affiliates with inter-
nal debt, leading to a ‘base’ stock of internal debt in these affiliates that does not 
respond to tax rates and leads to the smaller estimated responses in regressions (5) 
to (7).
Results on control variables furthermore show a small negative effect of an affili-
ate’s size (measured in total external assets) on the use of internal debt in the full 
sample without affiliate fixed effects, but estimates in the subsample of foreign affili-
ates are insignificant. When including affiliate dummies, the effect gets slightly posi-
tive. Inflation rates in the host country have a significantly negative impact on both 
the internal-gross-liabilities-to-total-assets ratio and the internal-net-debt ratio, per-
haps reflecting higher risks. When including affiliate fixed effects, this effect van-
ishes. A negative effect also arises from GDP growth, possibly because banks do 
not shift funds away from affiliates in fast growing countries. As expected, the share 
of the financial sector in a country’s gross value added has a significantly positive 
effect on the internal-gross-liabilities-to-total-assets ratio in regression (1). How-
ever, on the internal-net-debt ratio we can only find a positive effect when including 
bank affiliate fixed effects.
Table 5 shows results of the bilateral debt shifting regressions that allow use of 
the precise corporate tax rate differential as a measure for the shifting incentive. For 
this tax rate differential a significantly positive effect on bilateral-internal-net-debt-
to-total-assets of 0.033 arises in the baseline regression, and of 0.042 when includ-
ing affiliate fixed effects. In the subsample of foreign affiliates these effects are even 
Table 5  (continued)
i indicates the affiliate and j the country of the internal counterpart to/from which loans are given/
obtained. IntNetDebtij
TAi
 is the ratio of internal liabilities net of internal claims between affiliate i and affiliates 
of the same bank group in country j relative to total external assets of affiliate i if positive, and zero oth-
erwise. Regulatory index captures the stringency of capital regulation in a country, ranging from 0 to 10 
(higher values indicating greater stringency). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by bank-counter-
part-pairs and country-month. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels. Monthly bilat-
eral bank data for 07/2014–12/2015 from the External Positions of Banks database of Deutsche Bundes-
bank (2015)
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larger: In regression (3) a coefficient of 0.059 arises, meaning that a 10 percentage 
points higher corporate tax rate differential leads to an increase in the bilateral-inter-
nal-net-debt ratio by 0.59 percentage points. Compared to the sample mean (3.2% 
in foreign affiliates) this corresponds to an increase of 18%. This result is in line 
with banks shifting profits through internal debt from higher-taxed to lower-taxed 
affiliates. Moreover, this implied semi-elasticity also quantitatively confirms the 
20% increase in internal net debt ratio (in response to a 10 percentage points corpo-
rate tax rate increase) which we find in Table 4. When controlling for affiliate fixed 
effects in column (4), the estimated coefficient increases even further to 0.094.
Note that in the bilateral debt regressions in Table  5 the estimated tax effect 
increases when including bank affiliate dummies, whereas with aggregate internal 
net debt as the  dependent variable in Table 4 the tax effect is smaller with bank 
affiliate dummies. This implies that internal net debt is highly responsive to changes 
in the internal counterpart’s tax rate (the potential destination for profits), whereas 
banks do not respond equally strongly to changes in the host country’s tax rate.
Results on host country control variables of affiliate i are qualitatively similar 
to the estimates for aggregate debt data in Table 4. In bilateral regressions we also 
include macroeconomic control variables for the country from which the internal 
net debt is taken. For the internal counterpart’s country we find a positive effect 
of the GDP that probably comes from the fact that German banks partially finance 
a stronger engagement in large countries through internal debt. Interestingly, the 
capital requirement in the internal counterpart’s country has a significantly negative 
effect on bilateral internal net debt: Additional claims have to be backed by addi-
tional equity to fulfil capital requirements; hence a higher capital requirement can 
discourage internal lending.
To summarize, both aggregate and bilateral internal debt regressions on Ger-
man multinational banks indicate that banks engage in debt shifting. Moreover, the 
estimated effect in the banking sector is larger than previous studies estimated for 
non-financial firms, both absolutely and relative to the sample average of internal 
debt ratios. This becomes even clearer when we correct for conduit entities: Since 
conduit affiliates are taxed lower than the sample average, using the internal-net-
debt ratio as the dependent variable leads to even larger estimated tax responses. 
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Accounting for conduit debt is also a more general methodological issue that can be 
addressed by future empirical internal debt shifting studies on non-banks.
6  Conclusion
The immaterial nature of the banking business and the concentrated expertise in the 
optimal design of financial transactions suggest that the financial sector may use its 
tax planning possibilities more aggressively than other sectors do. However, there 
are only a few studies considering tax avoidance in the banking sector. Contributing 
to this literature, our paper is the first that investigates internal debt shifting in the 
financial sector. We show that banks engage in debt shifting, with a ten percentage 
points higher tax rate increasing the internal-net-debt-to-total-assets ratio by about 
5.7 percentage points. At the mean this corresponds to an increase of 20%. Moreo-
ver, a comparison of our results to previous studies on non-financial firms suggests 
that banks use debt shifting more aggressively.
We furthermore show that it is important to account for conduit entities in inter-
nal debt financing, as results with the classical measure for internal debt shifting 
are downward biased. This mismeasurement is not only important in the context of 
internal debt shifting in the financial sector, but also for multinationals in general. 
Anecdotal evidence shows that also multinational enterprises in other sectors estab-
lish affiliates acting as internal banks (The Guardian 2014). If these internal banks 
are mainly located in low-tax countries, previous studies have underestimated the 
extent of tax avoidance through the use of internal debt. Similarly, studies measur-
ing tax impacts on capital structure more generally may also suffer from measure-
ment error and should use net positions.
Acknowledgements We thank Ulrich Glogowsky, Andreas Haufler, Marko Köthenbürger, Dirk Schindler 
and participants of the annual conference of the German Economic Association, the Public Economics 
Research Seminar at the ifo Institute and at the University of Munich for helpful comments and sug-
gestions. Reiter gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Egon-Sohmen-Foundation. We also 
thank the Deutsche Bundesbank for granting access to the External Positions of Banks database. A previ-
ous version of the paper was circulated under the authorship of Reiter; Langenmayr and Holtmann joined 
the project later.
Funding Open Access funding provided by Projekt DEAL.
 F. Reiter et al.
1 3
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen 
ses/by/4.0/.
Appendix
Variable definitions
See Table 6.
Table 6  Variable definitions and sources
Data sources marked with a * are complemented by data from national statistical offices
Variable Definition
Bank-level variables from Deutsche Bundesbank (2015)
Internal liabilities (IntLiab) Liabilities to affiliates of the same bank group
Internal claims Claims to affiliates of the same bank group
Internal net debt (IntNetDebt) Volume of internal liabilities that effectively shift profits out of an affili-
ate, defined as max(IntLiab − InternalClaims;0)
Total assets (TA) Total external assets of an affiliate
Conduit debt Internal liabilities that are effectively passed through an affiliate (i.e. 
being opposed by internal claims of the same amount); defined as 
min(InternalClaims;IntLiab)
Conduit share Share of internal liabilities that are passed through an affiliate, defined as 
min(
InternalClaims
IntLiab
;1)
Country-level variables
Corporate tax rate (CTR) Statutory corporate tax rate on bank profits (Source: Ernst & Young 
2011, 2014)
GDP Nominal gross domestic product, monthly values interpolated with 
the proportional Denton method (Bloem et al. 2001) (Source: IMF, 
OECD*)
Inflation rate Consumer price inflation rate (Source: IMF*)
GDP growth Annual growth rate of real GDP (Source: IMF*)
Financial sector share Share of the banking and insurance sector in a country’s gross value 
added, monthly values interpolated using cubic spline interpolation 
(Source: OECD*)
Capital requirement Minimum regulatory capital requirement for banks (Source: World Bank 
2011)
Regulatory index Index on capital regulation, capturing whether capital requirements are 
adjusted for individual risk of banks, whether the regulatory capital 
is adjusted for certain market value losses and whether certain funds 
may be used to capitalize a bank; ranging from 0 (low stringency) to 10 
(high stringency) (Source: Barth et al. 2013)
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Conduit share regressions
See Table 7.
Table 7  Regressions on 
affiliates’ conduit shares
Dependent variable is the share of conduit debt in total internal lia-
bilities as defined by max( InternalClaimsit
InternalLiabilitiesit
; 1) . Ln(TA) is the natural 
logarithm of affiliate i’s total external assets. Financial sector share 
is the share of the banking and insurance sector in a country’s gross 
value added. Headquarter is a dummy indicating whether affiliate i 
is a German headquarter. Regulatory index captures the stringency 
of capital regulation in a country, ranging from 0 to 10 (higher val-
ues indicating greater stringency). Standard errors in parentheses. 
***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels. Monthly 
bank data for 06/2010-12/2015 from the External Positions of Banks 
database of Deutsche Bundesbank (2015)
Dep. var. Conduit share in internal debt
(1) (2) (3)
CTR − 0.550*** − 0.527*** − 0.347***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.044)
Ln(TA) − 0.005*** 0.006*** − 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln(Population) − 0.032*** − 0.034*** − 0.037***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Inflation rate 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growth 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial sector share 0.407*** 0.387*** 0.361***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.059)
Headquarter 0.379*** 0.372*** 0.468***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Regulatory index − 0.029*** − 0.028*** − 0.025***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Capital requirement − 3.091*** − 3.580*** − 5.598***
(0.489) (0.487) (0.445)
Monthly time FE ✓ ✓
Bank group FE ✓
R2 0.127 0.147 0.345
Observations 19,754 19,754 19,754
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